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ABSTRACT: In some societies outside-entrepreneurs are more active than community-inside 
entrepreneurs. Institution, and relationships entrepreneurs entertain may hamper insiders from 
starting or succeeding. Institutional economics and anthropology suggest that, rather than 
outside-entrepreneurs having more resources, inside-entrepreneurs may be hampered by a 
community’s institutions that blind and social relations that bind. Outsiders may, however be 
less inclined to generate societal value. 
 
1. Introduction 
The inclination to start a new business is widespread in most countries – many entrepreneurs 
are motivated not just by profit but also by concern for social value for a local community and 
society. Since in developing and emerging economies entrepreneurship out of necessity is 
high, one would expect that such economies would only need to rely to a limited extent on 
outsiders to start new businesses. Yet, in different parts of the world, what we call outside-
entrepreneurs seem to be more than proportionally active than community-inside 
entrepreneurs. Lebanese and Indians in large parts of Africa, and Chinese in large parts of 
Asia are well-documented examples (McCabe et al. 2005). Their individual entrepreneurial 
spirit and community structure are much heralded. As much as the spirit and sense of 
community of outside entrepreneurial networks may be an explanation for the success of 
outside entrepreneurs, a neglected reason, we submit, is the institutional fabric or furniture of 
the welcoming community.  Curaçao, for instance, a country in the South Caribbean which is 
our empirical case study, sees entrepreneurs who are not community-insiders but rather 
outside-entrepreneurs, more than proportionately, it seems, in sectors of the industry where 
you would not expect them.  
Drawing on institutional economics and anthropology, emphasizing the role of 
informal institutions in society, we discuss factors shaping the societal impact from inside- 
and outside-entrepreneurs. Outside-entrepreneurs may be less embedded in local 
communities, and less supportive of creating social value. While inside-entrepreneurs may 
place greater emphasis on creating social value in their community, they are also, however, 
heavily impacted by norms and expectations in their immediate social environment. Among 
these are expectations that the proceeds of an enterprise be shared by (social) entrepreneurs to 
a wider circle, such as an extended family. If community-inside social entrepreneurs cannot 
escape the ties and the claims informally entailed, they find themselves resource-bound, 
preventing them from setting up a business, from growing a business, possibly leading to 
discontinuation of the business. Outside entrepreneurs do not face these institutions that bind 
and favors that blind. 
 
2. Entrepreneurship: opportunity-recognizing vs. need-driven 
The literature on entrepreneurship has boomed in the last years. This literature has spurned a 
number of different theories explaining the emergence of entrepreneurs and their effects on 
society. A major source of conceptual insight is Baumol (1990). Baumol’s ideas, about 
entrepreneurship being productive, sometimes unproductive, and possibly having darker 
aspects, are insightful and at the same time not fully explored even to date. 
Entrepreneurs tend to be looked at as individuals who spot and exploit opportunities 
that others do not recognize or dare to pursue (Eckhardt & Shane 2003). Opportunity 
recognition can require the use of a set of skills, including cognitive skills that non-
entrepreneurs do not possess. Many governments seek to stimulate these individuals to being 
more entrepreneurial, as the thought is that entrepreneurship in a country will positively 
influence that countries economic success. 
This positive connection from entrepreneurship to economic development for a 
country does not necessarily hold in all circumstances (Van Stel et al. 2005). A country can 
have too many entrepreneurs for its economic good. Especially when a country does not have 
a social security system, entrepreneurship can be need-driven, as individuals seek 
(desperately) to provide for themselves. There is no reason to assume that, for otherwise 
comparable countries in terms of economic development, opportunity-recognizing or need-
driven entrepreneurship will differ substantially. Within any particular economy, it is 
reasonable to assume that need-driven entrepreneurship will be present more in industries that 
show low entry and exit barriers particularly in terms of capital investments needed, low scale 
economies, and a relatively stable products or services offering. Need-driven entrepreneurship 
would also be expected to focus on the local market that such entrepreneurs know well. It is 
remarkable to see how this expectation, drawing on existing entrepreneurship literature, turns 
out to be in need of rectification. A lack of understanding of how entrepreneurs are embedded 
in society is the reason for this need to rectify. 
 
3. Entrepreneurs in Curaçao Society 
Curaçao is a newly founded country in the South Caribbean. It is a former Dutch colony, now 
catering its economy to the financial sector and to tourism, increasingly feeling the vagaries of 
a global economy (Goede 2008). Relative to neighboring countries, with its 140 thousand 
inhabitants, Curaçao is an open economy and at approximately $15k GDP/capita relatively 
wealthy. Wealth, however, is unequally distributed, and many people in Curaçao are poor. 
Family structures in Curaçao are such that family bonds are strong towards the immediate 
nucleus family but also towards more distant family members as well as to non-family. At the 
same time, however, many children are born out of wedlock, and single-parent households are 
common (Abraham-van der Mark 2003; Stutterheim et al. 2013).  
Entrepreneurship out of need may be relatively high in Curaçao. Poverty in Curacao is 
high due to an unequal distribution of income in Curacao and a high unemployment rate 
(13%; CBS, 2013) results need-driven entrepreneurship.  While the majority of these need-
driven entrepreneurs operate in the formal economy, there is a small number that operates in 
the informal economy. A social security system is not well developed due to a lack of 
resources. Because of the open nature of its economy, and the strong focus on services, 
competition in many markets is tough. Recognizing and developing opportunities unique to 
Curaçao are either easily copied because they tend to be in service industries, or not readily 
exploited at sufficient scale because of the size of the native market.  A number of markets are 
highly regulated by government.  
As part of the transition process of Curacao towards obtaining an autonomous status 
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a Socio-Economic Initiative [SEI] was implemented 
in 2010. The purpose of the SEI was to improve the economic structure and social sectors of 
Curacao society. One of the priority areas defined was restructuring the economy in terms of 
(a) research in support of long term economic development, (b) improving investment 
climate, (c) promoting entrepreneurship, and (d) investing in the economic infrastructure 
(DEZ, 2010).  The SEI primarily focuses on stimulating inside-entrepreneurs by assisting 
them to start up projects, businesses, and explore new opportunities generally. However, 
considering the urgency for Curacao to strengthen its economy, outside-entrepreneurs, mainly 
opportunity-driven were accepted as well. 
In line with the open nature of its economy, many businesses are owned by outside-
entrepreneurs. In some sectors, however, this is much more common, as Table 1 shows. 
Sectors in the economy where outside-entrepreneurs dominate are the sectors where one 
would, paradoxically, expect insider-entrepreneurs who are need-driven to be present in large 
numbers in particular. The sectors of ‘commerce’ and ‘horeca’ are sectors where outsider 
entrepreneurs are more frequently present. Manufacturing and Fisheries, for instance, shows 
almost an equal number of outside- and inside-entrepreneur as self-production is stimulated 
by the government in order to save foreign currency and to diversify the supply.  The next 
section will offer an explanation of the widely varying degrees to which firms in industries 
may be operated by outsider entrepreneurs. 
 
Table 1: Outside- and Inside-Entrepreneurs in Curaçao, 2014 
  
Nationality Entrepreneur     
Native 
(Inside-) 
Entrepreneurs 
Non-native 
(Outside-) 
Entrepreneurs 
Total 
Entrepreneurs 
% Inside-
Entrepreneurs 
ISIC
4 
Agriculture 
and Fisheries 20 19 39 51.3 
Mining 1 1 2 50 
Manufacturin
g 156 115 271 57.6 
Electricity 
Production 1 0 1 100 
Water 
Production 12 4 16 75 
Construction 147 92 239 61.5 
Commerce 650 817 1467 44.3 
Horeca 312 473 785 39.7 
Transport & 
storage 91 52 143 63.6 
ICT 81 57 138 58.7 
Finance and 
Insurance 120 108 228 52.6 
Immobile 
property 122 94 216 56.5 
Specific 
Profession 238 203 441 54 
Other 
business 
service 
189 107 296 63.9 
Education 63 40 103 61.2 
Healthcare 313 118 431 72.6 
Other Service 102 77 179 57 
Culture, 
Sports & 
recreation 
222 202 424 52.4 
Total 2840 2579 5419 52.4 
Source: CBS (2014). 
4. Inside-Entrepreneurial Disadvantage: Institutions that Bind and Gifts that Blind  
One reason for the pervasiveness or outside-entrepreneurs can be because societies, and the 
economies that support them, are characterized by an institutional ‘furniture’, cumulatively 
developed over time (Veblen, 1961), that differ in the extent to which they provide 
circumstances for entrepreneurs to prosper. Entrepreneurs in any industry are part of both the 
larger economy, but, importantly, also part of a larger society or community (Dolfsma, Finch 
& McMaster 2005). These links can differ between communities in nature and in strength. In 
some communities or societies, links between entrepreneurs and members of society are 
strong. Members of society can be family members, friends, or neighbors. In some societies, 
the relevant societal group entrepreneurs link with is large. Families may be large, especially 
extended families. Friends and neighbors, even relatively distant ones, may need to be treated, 
according to a society’s social institutions, in a welcoming and inclusive manner: the, largely 
informal, institutional furniture of society (Veblen 1961) may prescribe as much.  
These connections can help provide support for the entrepreneur, in the sense of 
providing advice, occasional assistance, and perhaps funding. At the same time, however, 
requests for assistance and support that emerge from societal group members can be difficult 
to ignore. People may not even need to explicitly voice a request, as entrepreneurs may 
volunteer assistance. Perhaps entrepreneurs do so because they are imbued with the social 
institutions of society, or perhaps because they are fearful of reputational loss.   
Especially when the resources or the products that entrepreneurs have at their disposal 
are visible and small or divisible, will there be requests for assistance, support, or “gifts” 
generally. Darr (2003) thus claims that gift exchange and market transactions are ‘inextricably 
intertwined’ in contemporary markets (cf. Dolfsma et al., 2005; Granovetter, 1985). 
Entrepreneurs cannot refuse to give without jeopardizing their position in society, and hence 
jeopardizing potential future business. The possibility to give cannot be denied, and each 
individual item gifted will not in itself risk the business of the entrepreneur.  
Anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1954) has argued persuasively that all who aspire to be 
a member of a group are to give, receive and reciprocate gifts. What are appropriate gifts to 
give, and how large an appropriate gift needs to be depends on position of the individual in its 
community, and on institutions in society in general (Dolfsma et al. 2009). Givers and givees 
feel socially and morally obliged to act according to the institutions of society about what is 
appropriate gift giving behavior (cf. Schein, 1965). Refusing to give to a member of 
community is to exclude this person from a community. Alternatively, to refuse a gift 
extended is to refuse a relationship and one’s role in that relation (Ferrary, 2003; Mauss, 
1954). The institutions indicating what appropriate gift giving behavior is are largely informal 
(Dolfsma et al. 2009; Hemetsberger & Reinhardt 2009). In Curaçao, for an entrepreneur to 
ignore a question to be given or to be offered a special ‘family’ or ‘friends’ price (in official 
Curaçao national language, Papiamentu: “Dunami e na prijs di familia” or “Dunami e na 
prijs di amigu”) is tantamount to ex-communicating the person (or be excommunicated 
oneself.  
 Outsider entrepreneurs are not (or: less) socially obliged to participate in gift giving 
behavior in the society they have settled into. Because of informal institutions that insider-
entrepreneurs must adhere to, in some communities, to provide gifts to community members, 
inside-entrepreneurs are can be at a disadvantage compared with outside-entrepreneurs.  In 
industries in which what can be given is visible and relatively small, outside entrepreneurs do 
not bear the social burden of possible excessive giving. In Table 1, comparing the percentage 
of inside and outside entrepreneurs in Curaçao, by sector of the economy, this is indicated, 
though not definitively proven. Sectors where one would expect inside-entrepreneurs to 
dominate, outside-entrepreneurs rather dominate. We submit here that the extent to which 
gifts are expected, or even claimed, by members of a community can explain the differences 
by sector to a large degree. The smaller a gift potentially is, the more difficult it is to ignore 
the expectation of a givee to be handed a gift by an entrepreneur, and hence the more frequent 
claims there will be.  
 
This discussion leads us to make two observations about Curaçao and similar societies and the 
role of outside-entrepreneurs in them. 
First of all, the literature on gift-exchange suggests that, at any moment in time, gift 
giving is unbalanced, with one party having, at any one point in time, an outstanding ‘debt’ in 
terms of a reciprocal gift to be expected by the other. If one is perceived as a gift exchange 
debtor, one’s status or reputation within a community is low, ceteris paribus (Flynn, 2003). If, 
objectively, over time, a gifts balance between any two individuals in a community is 
maintained, inside-entrepreneurs would not be disadvantaged since any gift an inside-
entrepreneur gives is reciprocated. What is also known from the anthropological literature on 
gift exchange, however, is that over time a gifts balance may not be objectively there. In a 
subjective sense, however, imbalances may persist. Those who are generally believed in 
society to be powerful, central players, receive more than they give. As Homans (1950, p. 
182) points out: ‘‘the higher a man’s social rank, the larger will be the number of persons that 
originate interaction for him’’ (cf. Darr, 2003). Bodemann (1988) point out that powerful 
individuals – in a position to confer benefits to others - receive more gifts than less powerful 
individuals (cf. Simmel, 1996). What they reciprocate can in subjective terms be perceived as 
highly valuable to the giver. In a society where outside-entrepreneurs are privileged and 
inside-entrepreneurs disadvantaged because of the gift giving behaviour expectations towards 
either points to a perception of entrepreneurs as less privileged. In Curaçao society, indeed, 
entrepreneurs appear to not be as widely respected as in some other societies. 
 A second observation is about the outside-entrepreneurs. The literature praises them as 
individuals and praises in particular as well the close-knit communities they are embedded in 
(McCabe et al. 2005). The question we address in this paper about the communities or 
societies that outside-entrepreneurs enter points to the observation that outside-entrepreneurs 
can be successful in a community precisely because the society they enter is characterized by 
an inclusive, closely-knit culture with extensive, informal support structures and gift giving 
behavior. The related behaviours and expectations are deeply inculcated in all members of 
this society, and noticeable from the (informal) institutional furniture that characterizes this 
society 
 
5. Conclusions 
Entrepreneurship is generally seen as mostly if not wholly beneficial to the economy and to 
society. Some attention, conceptually as well as empirically, is paid to the problematic 
consequences for society of entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990). We have here focused on a 
different ‘dark side’ of entrepreneurship, relating to entrepreneurs’ role in society and the 
informal ‘license’ extended by society to operate as entrepreneurs. Drawing on social 
exchange theory generally in general and gift exchange theory from anthropology in 
particular, we have argued why in some societies, in some industries, one sees many more 
what we call outside-entrepreneurs than one would expect. Entrepreneurship due to 
opportunity-recognition or because it is need-driven can largely be assumed to be equal across 
societies.  In some societies expectations from community members towards those from the 
same community who are entrepreneurs to provide assistance and gifts generally can be 
onerous. This provides possibilities for outsiders to be a successful entrepreneur in such a 
society. What is more, as we have documented for the country of Curaçao, due to the social 
and institutional ‘furniture’ of a society, industries where one would expect most need-driven 
entrepreneurship are especially likely to see outside-entrepreneurs thrive. 
 More generally, from a theoretical point of view, we would like to submit the 
proposition that in societies where sharing because of mutual dependence to survive, where 
group norms stimulating sharing, or where the gift-community is large (e.g. due to extended 
family structures), entrepreneurship by outside-entrepreneurs will be more common. The 
entrepreneurship literature is in need of an infusion from institutional economics to 
understand this and related phenomena better. 
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